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BUDGET DEFICITS AND INDIRECT TAXES: DURING THE 




           
Abstract 
 
The main purpose of this study is to examine a relationship between 
budget deficit and indirect taxes in political instability. Between 1985 
and 2003, budget policies were influenced by unstable political 
conditions. In order to explain the financing of the budget deficits 
under the political instabilities. In the first part  of the study, 
theoretical developments will be explained. Second, Turkish political 
and economic conditions will be analyzed. Third, econometric tests 
and results will be discussed. We propose that indirect taxes are more 
utilized than direct taxes during the political instability periods 
 
JEL Classification: H61, H62, C33, C5 




   Growing goverment expenditures and the budget deficits are 
frequently examined themes in macro-economic policy a nalysis. 
Budget deficits are determined by several factors, for example; 
revenue indeficiency, increasing goverment expenditures, etc. For 
coalition periods some new factors must be added to these elements. 
For example, under the unstable political conditions, political 
polarization and coalitions cause some lags in reform processes 
which, in turn result in budget deficits. Uncertainity in the results of 
the elections and in the foreign exchange system bring about many 
forecasting diffuculties in forming of the state budgets which leads to 
budget deficits. Instruments, utilized by goverments for the deficit 
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finance are domestic, and external debts and monetization. But, there 
are some constraints on utilizing the financial resources by the 
goverments. In this context, sustainable deficit level is the most 
argued subject. If existing deficit is greater than the sustainable 
deficit level, goals of the program must be revised or fiscal policy 
must be shifted (We will not argue monetarist arithmetic, FTPL, and 
Barro’s proposition in this study).  
 
   In theory, there are three approaches concerning the financing of 
public expenditures. The first approach takes into account the real 
effects of the financial policies, while the second one emphasizes 
nominal effects. Irrelevance theory, is the third aprroach for the 
financing of public expenditures, denies real and nominal effects. 
According to Irrelevance theory, citizens know that increases in 
public expenditures will be resulted in tax increases. 
 
   Friedman’s(1978), and Buchanan and Wagner’s (1977) works we 
could examine the theoretical framework more closely. According to 
Friedman  taxes are the important tools for reducing the budget 
deficits. He emphasizes that incrasing taxes cause larger budget 
deficits not growing expenditures..Buchanan and Wagner  think that 
taxes are not the cause of the spending but solution for the budget 
deficits. Opposite of Friedman, they think that tax increases can meet 
budget deficits. 
  
   Barro(1974), and Peacock and Wiseman (1979) approach to the 
problem from the expenditure-tax hypothesis. Tax smoothing 
hypothesis proposed that increases in goverment expenditures are 
followed by tax increases which are permanent in character. Wildask  
rejects this view, depicts that goverment expenditures and taxes are 
independent from each other. Since, during the rises in taxes 
expenditures will not change, increses in taxes can reduce budget 
deficit. 
 
   The most of the empirical tests on budget deficits and taxes are for 
developed countries. For example, Manage and Marlow (1986), and 
Ram(1988) show that taxes are the cause of expenditures in the Bildirici, M. and Cosar, N.          Budget deficits and indirect taxes 
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U.S.A. Miller and Russel(1990) find that there is a reciprocal 
deterministic relationship between goverment expenditures and taxes.  
 
   Owaye (1995) i nvestigated the relationship between expenditures 
and taxes for G7 countries for the period between 1961 and 1990. 
Except for Japan and Italy, it is showed that this relationship is 
reciprocal. Chang (1999) is tested this relationship for Latin 
American countries. Darrot (2002) tests for Tunusia ve Lebonan, and 
Chang ve Ho (2002) for Taiwan.  
 
   In this studies, one of the important point is that the structure of the 
goverment is neglected. The structure of the goverment is very 
important for the relationship between public expenditures and 
taxation. Diversity of opinions in coalition goverments  causes rises 
in public expenditures and enlarges the budget deficits. Despite the 
fact that, each coaliton member desires to balance the budget, 
polarization and tension in the parliament bring about greater budget 
deficits. 
 
   According to Bussiere and Multer (1999), political instability  is 
determined by a) political polarization in the parliament, b)coalition 
goverments, c) undecided voters and fickleness of the voters, d) the 
control and timing of the elections. They emphasize the relationship 
between political instability and budget deficits. According to them, 
polical polarization and coalitions cause some retards in the reform 
processes which result in budget deficits. 
 
   According to Cukierman and Edwards (1992), due to possible shift 
of goverments, political instability and polarizaton,  political system 
rely on more  seigniorage.  In that case, seigniorage (and/or in 
coalition period) is replaced the taxation in order to finance budget 
deficits. Tax system is not efficient in this situation. A.Hossain ve A. 
Chowdhury (1998), emphasize on these points for developing 
countries; 
a. Soft budgets and macro-economic populism cause public sector 
deficits, high inflation rates, and increasing external imbalances,  
b. political instability results in budget deficits; budget deficits bring 
about a deterioriation in nominal and financial responsibilities. International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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   In this paper, we expect that  coalition goverments cause some 
problems in decision making processes and policy implementations. 
High tension in the parliament also influences decision making 
process in a negative way. This, in turn, results in inefficiency ; 
Especially, in taxation. 
 
2. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND TURKISH ECONOMY  
 
a) General Characteristics of Political Developments in Turkey 
   The 1980s were very complicated period of the Turkish politics and 
the economy. Between 1980 and 1983 political instability is the low, 
because of the military coup of 1980. Military Coup opened a new 
era in Turkish politics and the economy. Following  this era, ANAP 
(Motherland Party) came to office and single party era started in 
1983. But, the rise of terorizm created increasing problems in the 
politics and the economy which continued until 2000s. In this era, 
social and political discontents and coaliton goverments will be 
analyzed as a part of political instabilities.  
 
   Political instabilities are seen as a result of polarization in the 
parliament, coalition goverments, voters indecisiveness and unstable 
voting, early elections, and terorist events. In the process of political 
instabilities, political polarization and coalitions caused lags in 
reforms; disagreement in coalition goverments on reforms resulted in 
budget deficits. Under the uncertainities, results of the elections also 
gave rise to difficulties on estimated budget deficits. High inflation 
rates affected the demand for domestic money, the stronger 
currencies demanded increasingly. The decreasing domestic demand 
for money reduced seigniorage gains. High inflation also stimulated 
bribery, corruption, unregistered economy, tax avoidance, and tax 
evasion. Since, increasing the direct taxes could cause tax avoidance 
and tax evasion,  which caused a decline  in  direct taxes . In that 
case,   goverments would select either borrowings or indirect taxes. 
In this study, we will test the relationship between budget deficits 
and indirect taxes. We assumpted that during the budget deficits, 
since direct taxes could not be increased, indirect taxes will be raised.  
Political instabilities after 1980 
 Bildirici, M. and Cosar, N.          Budget deficits and indirect taxes 
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   The number of the political parties joined the elections was the 
important indicator of the political instabilities in Turkey after 1980. 
In 1983, the number of parties were three. This reached to 21 in 1999 
election. While the increasing in the number of parties, the 
unrepresented votes in the parliament also went up. Such as, in 1983 
it was 1.1 %, in 1987 19.8 %, in 1995 14.4 %, in 1999 18.8 %.  
 
   In Graph 1, the results of the elections are showed. The results of 
the elections depicts the instability of th parliament. The results could 
fluctuate among the parties from one election to another. So, if one 
party won one election, in the second or third election could lost 
power. Voters were looking for a new parties in the next election. So, 
we could say that the number of partisan voters were few. The 
structure of the politics directly affected the structure of the 
parliament and made parliament infragile and fragmented. 
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   Comparing the results of elections between 1991 and 2002 showed 
voters fluctuating and unstable attitudes to the political parties. DSP, 
the winner of the 1999 election  lost power and could not pass the 10 
% barage in 2002 election. CHP could not pass the barage in 1999 
election became a second party in 2002. Newly found party AKP 
won the 2002 election. AKP won the elections in most of the International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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provinces in Turkey. Permanent changes in goverments and in 
politics increase the fragility of stability. In this context, one of the 
interesting point was that the balance between the central and 
extreme votes. In Graph 2, it is seen that central votes are falling, 
extreme votes are rising. (Bildirici M.,2000) 
 











1987  1989  1991  1992  1994  1995  1999  2002 
C.Left  C.Right   Rel.  Nat. 
 
   Graph 2 shows the voters behaviors which is fluctuating. Votes are 
switching to extreme political parties. This situation is very important 
for political instability. Voters are permanently s earching for a new 
parties in order to solve their problems. There is not partisans, 
pragmatically switching from one party to another. The situation of 
the ruling party of 1999 election lost most of the voters in 
2002.Unstable voters are moving to opposition parties. (Bildirici 
M.,2000; Eren E. and Bildirici M.,1999b, 2001) 
 
   The unstable voters, their identifications and second choices are 
seen in Graph 3. Voters’ searching brought about  political instability 
and political instability push the voters searching. Right and left party 
voters define themselves as others not the rightists and leftists. This 
depicts that voters can not identify themselves or not find the 
concepts those define themselves. 30% of voters define themselves as 
others. 
 
                                                                 
1 C.Left showes central left votes, C.Right central right, Rel. Religious, Nat. 
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Graph 3 Political Identifications of Voters of  The Parties Until 1999 
vockcckkvcSource:  Eren E and Bildirici M 1999, 2001 
 
   This type of voters shift the vinner of the elections from one 
election to other. The ruling party could shift depending on the voters 
behaviors. 
  
   One of the important characteristics of the political instability is 
unstable, shifting behaviors of the parliamenters. Unstable is called 
as staying in the selected party or leaving the party by passing the 
another political party. Unstable number of parliamenters influence 
the ruling party and the goverments. Such as, twentieth ruling period 
which was commenced with 1995 elections, witnessed a severe 
instability in politics. Between 1995 and 1999, crises in Usual period 
for general elections were 5 year. But, with 1995 election crises in 
goverments and in political regime were increased the political 
instabilities. These political instabilities were depended on the period 
of the parliament and representation crises. The length of the 
legislation period was terminated in 3 years 4 months and 24 days. It 
was the shortest period in parliamentary history. This affected the 
coaliton goverment’s functions. The members of the coalition 
changed often in this short period. As it was seen in Table 1, three 
goverments were set up. 
 
Table 1  Goverments  Between 1995 and 1999  
  Beginnin
g 
Final  Duration 
ANAYOL(ANAP/DYP)  6.3.1996  28.6.1996  3 Months/22 Days 
REFAHYOL (RP/DYP)  28.6.1996  30.6.1997   1 year/2 days 
ANASOL-D 
(ANAP/DSP/DTP) 
30.6.1997  11.1.1999  1 year /6 Months/ 11 
days 
DSP (Minority)  11.1.1999  18.4.1999  3 Months / 7 days 
Source:Tuncer E.,1999   
 
   In this period, rotations in goverments and among the parliaments 
were a characteristic of this period. It is called as representation 
crises. Shifting balances in the parliament created  representation International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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problems. Table 2 shows the parties and their parliamenters in the 
parliament. 
  













  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
RP  158  158  0  0  0  0 
DYP  135  135  92  92  96  89 
ANAP  132  124  139  139  138  130 
DSP  76  76  63  63  61  59 
CHP  49  49  55  55  55  53 
BBP  0  7  8  8  8  8 
DTP  0  0  22  22  21  19 
MHP  0  0  2  2  3  4 
DP  0  0  1  1  1  1 
FP  0  0  0  122  145  144 
DEPA
R 
0  0  0  0  1  1 
BAG  0  0  160  38  12  29 
BOS  0  0  8  8  9  13 
TOP  550  550  550  550  550  550 
(1)The date of General Elections, (2)Parliamenters of BBP left the ANAP, 
(3)RP was shut down (4) FP set up a group in the parliament (5) the 
decision of early elections. (6) end of the 20
th period. 
 
   As it is seen on Table 2, the biggest party RP was shut down two 
years after the 1995 election. A new party FP was set up, and 
parliamenters of RP went to FP. The DYP had 135 parliamenters in 
elections, but at the end of the period it  was 89. The number of 
parliamenters of ANAP was 132, first dropped to 124, then went up 
to 139 at the end of the period decreased to 1930. The number of 
DSP’s parliamenters went down from 76 to 59. CHP could increase 
its number of parliamenters from 49 to 53. In 1995 election there was 
not any independent nominee, but before the 1999 election this 
increased to 29. 262 parliamenter shifted the parties which was the 
47.6 % of total members of the parliament. 98 of them changed their 
parties more than once (Tuncer E.,1999). One parliament shifted 
from one party to another 10 times, 9 parliaments 8 times, and 50 Bildirici, M. and Cosar, N.          Budget deficits and indirect taxes 
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parliamenter 2 times. This confusion in the politics brought about 
political instabilities, economic instabilities and worsening economic 
conditions. One of the indicator of the relationship between political 
instability and economic instability was pessimizm of voters and 
priorities for solving the problems. The election 2002, voters 
searched for stability and votes went to AKP. As a result of the 
elections, political instabilities became less. 
  
   The other factors which were affected political instability: 
terrorizm, bribery and corruption. Between 1990 and 2000 terrorism 
was an important factor in instabilities, but in the 2000s bribery and 
corruption became in front. 
 
b)The Structure of the Turkish Economy 
 
   Public sector has an important place in the Turkish economy, 
although this trend was tried to be revised after 1980’s. In 1980, with 
the announcement of a new policy of liberalism, economic policy 
shifted from inward oriented industrialization policy to export 
oriented industrialization policy  in Turkey (Önis Z.,1991, p.27-41). 
The stabilization policy which was announced on January 24, 1980, 
revised development and growth policies within the framework of an 
open economy and free market model, aimed at reducing the role of 
the goverment in economy, preventing the inflation, decreasing the 
budget deficits, increasing exports, reducing the wages. This new 
orientation produced dramatic changes in the nation's economic 
development strategy and directly influenced the scope of the public 
sector in the economy. Turkish economy was restructured constantly. 
Such as, the foreign exchange market was deregulated, the capital 
market was established (1982). Istanbul Stock Exchange was 
reopened (1985). 
 
   With the elections of the 1983, stability measures were terminated 
by the ANAP goverment. Goverment expenditures increased, 
terrorist events in South-east region fostered this process. Budget 
deficits and financing of this deficits increased instabilities in Turkish 
economy. After 1984, financial needs of the  public sector itself 
shaped the course of development of financial markets. Public sector International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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auctions for goverment securities started in 1985. Interbank money 
market was rearranged in 1986 and Central Bank started open market 
operations in 1987. Finally, capital flows were freed in 1989. Since 
1986, goverments became the major supplier of securities. The 
persistence of the large public sector deficits, despite its monopoly 
status, the goverment became in a disadvantageous position in the 
weak financial markets which kept interest rates high. As a 
proportion of GNP (Gross National Product), Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) rose from 4.6 percent to 7.4 percent 
between 1985 and 1990. It was 10.2 percent in 1991, 10.6 percent in 
1992, 12 percent in 1993.  After 1993, the ratio decreased  to 5 
percent. With 1996, the ratio  increased to 8.6 percent, in 1998 to 9.4 
percent, and to 15.5 percent in 1999. With ‘The Disinflation and 
Fiscal Adjustment Program’ which was announced at the end of 
1999, the ratio fell to the 11.8 percent in 2000, but in 2001, with ‘The 
Liquidity Crises’ it went up to 16.4 percent.The share of goverment 
expenditures in Gross National Product (GDP) was 14 % between 
1981 and 1990, it increased to 20 % in 1991 onwards. State 
Economic Enterprises which had bureautratic and over-employment 
problems led to growing public sector deficits with political 
deformation and corruption in politics.  
Problems are Growing 
 
   “ The 1987 is very important year for Turkish economy, in the 
sense that it  marked the return to fully competitive politics. The 
referendum of 1987 intensified the political struggle and placed 
pressure on the party in power to follow policies of ‘populist’ 
economic expansionism. ANAP lost general elections in 1991. The 
coalition goverment of DYP(the True Path Party) and the SHP(Social 
Democratic Populist Party) came to power in 1991. The full 
convertibility of the Turkish Lira in 1989 resulted in a dramatic 
increase in the international capital inflows to Turkey. The economy 
expanded at a faster rate than would otherwise have been possible 
and the rising capital inflows provided a way of satisfying the 
distributional claims o f the key groups (Önis Z. and  Aysan A.F.,  
2000,p.129).” 
  Bildirici, M. and Cosar, N.          Budget deficits and indirect taxes 
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   As a result of this process, Turkey has experienced high budget 
deficits, a rapid increase in government expenditures, inflation and 
political instability throughout the 1990s. The role of goverment 
expanded in the economy. Before 1980, goverments had utilized 
seignorage and inflation for financing public sector deficits; after 
1983, the revenue from these resources decreased. The introduction 
of convertible Turkish Lira and the other financial  tools brought 
about decline in the demand for money, but demand of other tools 
increased. As a result of changes in financial techniques, goverment 
revenues decreased. Between 1963 and 1980 the growth of real 
national income averaged around 10 percent and the growth of real 
demand for money was 2.33 percent. Between 1981 and 1995, 
growth of real national income stood around 10 percent, but the 
demand for money decreased to 1.8 percent. This situation shows 
that the goverments utilized numerous types of financial resources 
for financing the budget deficits, especially indirect taxes and 
domestic borrowings from capital and money markets became the 
main instruments in the economy.  
 
   Since, the beginning of the 1980s successive governments have 
made significant efforts to change the structure of the tax system. The 
most important features of the post-1980 tax reforms were providing 
adequate income to local governments and the introduction of Value 
Added Tax. From 1985 to 1990 the relative importance of income 
taxes declined because of discretionary tax rate reductions and the 
value added tax. Instead of moving toward the use of direct taxes, 
which is normally the case in the process of modern economic 
development, the strategy of export-led industrialization l ed the 
government to rely increasingly on domestic indirect taxes (Karatas 
C, 1992, p.41-62). During the coalition periods, impossibility of 
proposing an increase in direct taxes and a wide tax evasion shifted 
the structure of the tax system from direct taxes to indirect taxes. In 
2000, the share of indirect taxes in total tax revenues had already 
gone up to 60 percent. The share of direct taxes declined from 58 % 
in 1984 to 35 % in 2003. Graph 4 shows the development in the 
Turkish Tax Structure.  
 International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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Graph 4   Changes in the Tax Structure 
 
   During the military Coup from 1980 and 1983 political instabilities 
were at the low level. In tax system, the share of direct taxes in total 
tax revenues was 60 %. It went down to 47 % in 1985. At the end of 
the 2003 it went down to 35 %. In this process with political 
instabilities, the share of indirect taxes in total taxes increased. 
Problems in the tax collection methods, inadequate tax organizations 
and low tax effort affected budget financing policies. This policies 
were formed to collect more indirect taxes, which is easiest way to do 
it, instead of struggling for structural tax reforms under the 
instabilities in politics.  
 
   After 1985, government utilized more and more indirect taxes and  
internal borrowing instead of seigniorage put more pressure on 
budget deficits and external debts. Tax policy was shaped under the 
control of the IMF’s directions, mainly by increases in indirect taxes.  
 
3. Data and emprical result 
 
a) Data 
In this part of the study, the methods of budget deficit finance will be 
examined in Turkey, between 1985 and 2003. 1985 is the starting 
point for this study, because of the profound regulations in economic, 
fiscal and legal spheres. As a result of increasing public sector 
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rate payments became the half of the consolidated budgets in Turkey. 
.But, domestic borrowings is kept outside of this analysis.We object 
to test  the relationship between indirect taxes and  budget deficits.  
The final year of our study year is 2003. There are two basic variable 
in the study. One of them is the ratio of budget deficits to GNP, the 
other one is the ratio of indirect taxes to total tax revenues. Data is 
provided by State Statistical Institution, Ministry of Finance and 
State Planning Organization.  
 
b) Emprical Result 
In this research, first, the relationship between indirect tax revenues 
and budget deficits will be examined. Cointegration analysis is used 
in this study. In context of cointegraiton analysis, Granger (1981, 
1991), Granger and Weiss(1983) and Engle and Granger (1987) have 
shown that, even though a given set of series may be non-stationary, 
there may exist various linear combinations of the individual series 
that are stationary. The desire to estimate models that combine both 
short and long run properties and maintain stationary in all of the 
variables has prompted a reconsideration of the problem of 
regression using  variables measured in their levels. Cointegration is 
a necessary c ondition for error correction models to hold. The 
procedures for testing cointegration are the two-step residual –based 
procedure for testing the null of no cointegration due to Engle and 
Granger(1987) and Johansen (1991), the system-based reduced rank 
regression approach (Bakirtas T., Karbuz S. and Bildirici M., 
2000,p.24)  
 
   As Guisan (2001) pointed out in her article that cointegration tests 
had some perils. According Guisan, cointegration tests fail very often 
to recognise causal relations and, on the other hand, that approach 
does not always avoid the peril of accepting as causal relations those 
that really are spurious. However we are aware of the perils which 
Guisan emphasizes  
 
   By using cointegration analysis the relationship between budget 
deficits and indirect taxes is tested in the long run. The stationary of 
variables was checked by using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
unit root and Philips–Perron (1988) test techniques. The optimal lag International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
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number of series was determined AIC criteria. In Table 3, level 
indicates that null hypothesis for variables must not be rejected. It 
seems that first difference was stationary and that null hypothesis can 
be rejected.                      
 
Table 3. Unit Root Test for the Variables 
Variables  Level    First Difference 
Indirect Taxes  -1.525  -6.51 
Budget  Deficit  -1.9  -5.52 
  
   In the next step, The Engle-Granger’s two-step procedure is used 
for testing.  A direction of the interaction will be determined with 
Engle-Granger test.  
 
   The growing budget  deficits affects the  change in  indirect taxes 
and  tax rates.  The result for this cointegration regression are given 
below.  
 
Indirect taxes = -2,82 + 2,13 budget deficit 
                       (-24.5)  (3,7) 
R
2 = 0,97     DW= 0,65 
 
It will be applied the ADF test to the residual of the regression, we 
obtain a t -value the 5 % critical value.  Null hypothesis of no 
cointegration can rejected and we can accept that there is a 
relationship between indirect taxes and budget  deficits. 
 
  In order to prove the robutness of the cointegration results, it was 
carried out Johansen estimation procedure which uses full 
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Table 4. List of Eigenvalues 
Eigen value: 0.312  0.064 
Null  Max.Eigenvalues  CV  Trace  CV 
None  14.1  14.07  33.97  18.63 
At most 1  6.6  3.76  2.79  6.65 
 
   The test restriction of no more than r cointegration vectors against 
the alternative of r+1 such vectors. The trace statics test restriction of 
no more than r cointegration vectors against the alternative of r=0 . 
The hypothesis must n ot be rejected by both the maximum 
eigenvalue and the trace statistic values at the 95% level.  
 
   And in the final step,  in order to search a long-run relationship 
between indirect taxes and budget deficits, we used error correction 
model. Model results are below.  
 
Table 5. Error Correction Specification 
Dependent variable: D Indirect Taxes 
Variables  Coefficient  t 
C  0,34  2,76 
D Public Deficit  1.10  41.26 
Ut-1  -1.84  -8.68 
R
2 = 0.98  DW 2.12;   RSS= 0.016;   SE= 0.012;   X
2
SC (1)= 0.056; 
X
2
FF (1)= 0.256; X
2
N (2)= 1.5; X
2
H (1)= 0.056 
 
   As it is seen on Table 5, all variables are significant. The result of 
our analysis suggests short and long run elasticies of 1.10  and 2.3. 
These show that budget deficits play important role in taxation. If we 
question the role of political instability in this situation, we put a 
dummy variable in the analysis which contains political instability. 
Since the relationship between indirect taxes and coaliton goverments 





 International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-1(2005) 
  86 
Table 6. Error Correction Specification with Dummy 
Dependent Variable: D Indirect Taxes 
 Variables  Coefficient  t 
C  0.70  1.10 
D Public Deficit  1.09  3.91 
Ut-1  -1.4  -4.68 
Dummy  0.8  2.68 
R
2 = 0.75  DW 2.08  F= 25.11  SE= 0.02 
 
   The diagnostic tests i ndicate no misspecification.  The test with 
dummies shows very significant results in Table 6.    
 
   Change in budget deficits influences the indirect tax  ratios. The 
share of indirect taxes in total tax revenues is increasing in Turkey. 
Especially, during the coalition periods indirect taxes were increased 
while direct taxes had very limited changes. Turkey had coalition 
governments in the 1990s. We propose that, indirect taxes are 
favored by the goverments, because during the coalitions it is less 
harder to increase indirect taxes and to persuade coalition members 
than to modify direct taxes. It is also difficult to get an approval of 
direct tax proposal in the parliament. Because, coalition members do 
not want to take responsibility of the direct tax proposals which 
increase the tension of the parliament. According to Tanzi(1994), tax 
proposals become distorted during the drafting stage to such and 
extent as to be unrecognizable.  
 
   Once the laws are drafted and approved, extensive new regulations 
are needed. What the government really controls (with the 
cooperation of the legislature) is the statutory tax rates and some 
statutory definition of the tax bases. During the coalition periods it is 
hard to propose a change in direct taxes. There is a extensive pressure 
on the goverment and on the parliaments. Stronger classes can affect 
tax drafts in the parliament.  One of the crucial facts is that tax 
reforms remained as a permanent problem on the agenda of Turkish 
politics. The tax reforms applied in 1960, 1971, 1980 could be put 
into effect only during military regimes, while in the 1990s 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been the main factor behind Bildirici, M. and Cosar, N.          Budget deficits and indirect taxes 
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the tax reform proposals in Turkey. IMF forced to increase the tax 
revenues, but source of the revenue did not take into account. 
Whether direct taxes or indirect taxes did not make any difference for 
IMF, and hardships in increasing direct taxes stimulated goverments 




   This paper has examined the emprical relationship between budget 
deficits and indirect taxes between 1985 and 2003. The emprical 
findings suggest that during the coaliton periods indirect taxes are 
more utilized than direct taxes in order to finance budget deficits. 
There is a positive and strong relationship between budget deficits 
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